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Abstract
We analyze a market where some consumers only consider buying from a specic
seller while other consumers choose the best deal from several sellers. When sellers
are able to discriminate against their captive customers, we show that discrimination
harms consumers in aggregate relative to the situation with uniform pricing when
sellers are approximately symmetric, while the practice tends to benet consumers
in su¢ ciently asymmetric markets.
1 Introduction
In a market where some customers are captive to particular sellers while others can
choose freely among alternative o¤ers, is it good or bad for consumers overall if rms
can discriminate against their captive customers? Such discrimination is clearly bad for
the captives because they are monopolized, but perfect competition then prevails for the
custom of non-captives. With uniform pricing, on the other hand, captives get some
benet of competition, but competition is weakened by their presence, making the net
e¤ect unclear.
In this paper we show by way of a simple duopoly model that the answer depends on
the relative importance of (i) the degree of symmetry between rms and (ii) the ratio of
prot to deadweight welfare loss under monopoly. With symmetric rms, discrimination
against captive customers harms consumers overall because it does not reduce prots but
it widens the variation of prot across consumers. Under the mild regularity condition
that consumer surplus is a strictly concave function of prot, this mean-preserving spread
of prot is harmful to consumers. It is as though they are risk-averse to prot variation.
But if monopoly prot exceeds the associated deadweight loss, the comparison is reversed
Both authors at the Department of Economics and All Souls College, University of Oxford. We are
grateful to Martin Obradovits and Jidong Zhou for helpful comments.
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if there is enough asymmetry between rms. That is because uniform pricing, by softening
competition, raises prots by enough to make consumers worse o¤ despite their aversion to
the greater prot variation that comes with discrimination. The key step in our analysis,
following Armstrong and Vickers (2001), is to think of consumer surplus as a function of
prot. Familiar concavity arguments then yield welfare results quite directly.
Our model applies to situations where a seller has information about whether or not
a prospective customer is able or willing to consider rival sellers for her purchase. For
instance, some consumers might use a comparison website to choose between multiple
o¤ers while others shop more randomly, and a seller engages in price discrimination if it
chooses di¤erent prices on the comparison site and when consumers buy from it directly. A
chain store may have varying degrees of local competition across its stores, and can choose
higher prices in those outlets where consumers are more captive. An insurance seller (say)
might initially o¤er a customer a relatively expensive tari¤, especially if she is an existing
customer, which is then discounted if the customer says she has found a better deal. An
energy rm might o¤er a range of di¤erent tari¤s for its (essentially homogeneous) product,
where inert customers end up on the most expensive default tari¤ while more active
consumers shop around for cheaper (but often short term) o¤ers. Price discrimination in
such markets is a live policy issue, as regulators in the energy sector consider whether to
force suppliers to put all customers on their cheapest available tari¤ (or more generally to
limit the gap between the cheapest and the default tari¤s).
The model we analyse involves a market with homogeneous products where di¤erent
consumers are able or willing to consider di¤erent subsets of rms for their purchase. When
rms use uniform pricing, for instance because they have no information about whether
customers are captive or not, the equilibrium in a one-shot Bertrand interaction is typically
that rms use mixed strategies for their prices and there is price dispersion in the market.
(Papers in this tradition include Butters (1977), Varian (1980), and Burdett and Judd
(1983).) The paper in this class we follow most closely is Narasimhan (1988), who studies
a duopoly model where rms can be asymmetric. The advantage of studying a duopoly
market is that it is easily solved, while asymmetric models with more than two rms are
currently little understood when rms use uniform prices.
Our paper contributes to the analysis of price discrimination in oligopoly. A feature of
some oligopoly models is that, unlike the monopoly case, discrimination reduces equilib-
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rium prot see, for example, Thisse and Vives (1988) and Corts (1998) for analyses with
product di¤erentiation and deterministic prices. The same is true in our main model with
asymmetric sellers, but with symmetry equilibrium prots are the same with and without
discrimination, which is the key to the mean-preserving spread argument that is central to
our analysis. We also provide a modied model where rms see a noisy signal of whether
a consumer is captive, where price discrimination instead causes prot and prices to rise.
Whereas most of the literature on price discrimination explores the implications of di¤er-
ences of preferences across markets, our baseline model abstracts from this issue to focus
on discrimination on the basis of whether or not a consumer is captive. Recent papers
that also examine price discrimination not based on consumer preferences include Chen
and Riordan (2015) on cost-based di¤erential pricing, and Heidues and Köszegi (2017) on
discrimination based on indicators of consumer naivety.
After presenting our general modelling framework in the next section, where we show
how price discrimination based on whether a consumer is captive cannot improve industry
prot, we specialise the market in section 3 to duopoly. There we show how the impact of
price discirmination on consumers depends on the degree of asymmetry between sellers and
the degree of risk aversionto prot by consumers, where the former makes discrimination
more likely to benet consumers and the latter makes it less likely. Finally, in section 4
we show how the analysis can apply to situations where consumers have di¤erent demand
curves, and how the results are a¤ected if rms see only a noisy signal of whether a
consumer is captive. We show that a noisy signal can convert a symmetric market into a
pair of asymmetric markets, and thereby cause prot to rise and consumer surplus to fall.
2 A framework
There are n sellers which costlessly supply a homogeneous product. Consumers di¤er
according to which sellers they are able or willing to buy from, and an exogenous fraction
consider a given subset S  f1; :::; ng of sellers. Since consumers who do not consider
any sellers play no role in the analysis, suppose all consumers consider at least one seller
and normalize the measure of consumers to be 1. A consumer is captive to a seller if she
considers only that seller. Suppose seller i = 1; :::; n has i captive customers, and let
 = ni=1i be the total number of captive customers.
Figure 1 illustrates two patterns of consumer awareness in duopoly, where the left-hand
3
diagram shows a symmetric pattern of consideration sets (where the two sellers have the
same number of captive customers), while the right-hand diagram depicts a situation where
a smaller sellers potential customers all also consider the larger seller (i.e., the smaller seller
has no captive customers). This case of nested reach is relevant when, for instance, the
smaller rm is a recent entrant which is considered by only a subset of consumers.
Figure 1: Two industry congurations
Sellers compete in Bertrand manner, and a consumer will buy from the seller she
considers with the lowest price. Each consumer demands q(p) units of the product if the
price paid is p, where q() is a smooth and weakly decreasing function when positive. Thus,
if a consumer buys from a seller at price p she generates prot (p)  pq(p) for that seller.
Denote the prot-maximizing price by p and maximum prot by  = (p). A consumers
net surplus if she pays price p is the usual area under the demand curve
v(p) =
Z 1
p
q(~p)d~p :
Price discrimination: Suppose all sellers know for sure whether a consumer is captive
or not, in which case there is a unique equilibrium and this involves pure strategies. If a
consumer is contested, i.e., she considers at least two sellers, then Bertrand competition
forces the price to that consumer down to marginal cost, so that p =  = 0 and the
consumer enjoys surplus v(0). When the consumer is captive, her seller will charge the
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monopoly price p, so that  =  and the consumer obtains surplus v(p). Thus, aggregate
consumer surplus in this scenario is v(p) + (1  )v(0) while aggregate prot is .
Uniform pricing: When sellers either do not know when a consumer is captive, or
are not permitted to discriminate against captive customers, a seller must o¤er the same
price to all potential customers. If all consumers are captive ( = 1) then all sellers
choose the monopoly price, while if no consumer is captive ( = 0) all sellers choose
the competitive price,and in either of these extremes the outcome is the same with or
without price discrimination. When 0 <  < 1, however, the equilibrium with uniform
pricing involves at least some sellers using mixed strategies for their prices. Since aggregate
prot is a continuous function of the vector of prices chosen by the sellers, existence of
equilibrium is ensured by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, Theorem 5). Except in symmetric
and other special cases such as the duopoly market studied in section 3 the form of the
equilibrium is not known. Moreover, when the equilibrium is known it may not be unique.
However, since seller i can always choose the monopoly price and sell at least to its i
captive customers, in any equilibrium its expected prot must be at least i
. Therefore,
industry prot prot in any equilibrium with uniform pricing must be at least equal to
, which was the equilibrium prot with price discrimination.
Stating this result formally:
Proposition 1 Industry prot with price discrimination is no higher than industry prot
in any equilibrium with uniform pricing.
Consider the special case of unit demand, i.e., where q(p) = 1 if p  1 and q(p) = 0 for
p > 1, in which case p =  = 1. Then total welfare (prot plus consumer surplus) does not
depend on price and is identically equal to 1 regardless of the pricing strategies followed by
sellers. Since prot is weakly greater with uniform pricing, we have the following corollary
to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 If consumers have unit demand then aggregate consumer surplus with price
discrimination is no lower than consumer surplus in any equilibrium with uniform pricing.
In the next section we put more structure on the model to gain further insight into
when price discrimination of this form is harmful or benecial for consumers and for overall
welfare.
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3 A duopoly market
In broad terms, when sellers engage in price discrimination the result is that the average
prot generated from consumers falls but the variability of prot across consumers rises,
relative to the regime with uniform pricing. In this section we consider consumer surplus
as a function of the prot a consumer generates. In regular cases, this consumer surplus is
a concave function of prot, in which case consumers are risk aversetowards variation
in prot, and whether they prefer the regime with price discrimination depends on how
much industry prot falls.
In more detail, if (p) denotes elasticity of demand, 0(p) has the sign of 1  (p), and
so (p) is strictly single-peaked in p if
(p)   pq
0(p)
q(p)
strictly increases with p ; (1)
which is assumed henceforth.1 As before, denote the prot-maximizing price by p, in
which case only prices in the interval [0; p] will ever be chosen by sellers. Since prot (p)
is strictly increasing in [0; p], and since v(p) is strictly decreasing in p, we can construct
a decreasing function V () such that if the consumer generates prot  she enjoys net
surplus V (), so that
v(p)  V ((p)) : (2)
Di¤erentiating (2) shows that  q(p) = V 0((p))0(p), or
 V 0((p)) = 1
1  (p) :
In particular, assumption (1) implies V () is strictly concave on [0; ]. Since prot (p)
is strictly increasing over the relevant range [0; p], as in Armstrong and Vickers (2001)
we can view sellers as choosing the per-consumer prot  rather than the price p they ask
from their customers, and a consumer buys from the seller with the smallest  from the
set of sellers she considers.
An important determinant of the impact of price discrimination is whether the dead-
weight loss associated with monopoly pricing is smaller than monopoly prot. With unit
demand there is no deadweight loss from monopoly pricing, while when demand q(p) is
1Since unit cost has been normalized to zero, price p is net of cost. With positive cost, our regularity
condition (1) is met with constant elasticity of demand.
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linear one can check that deadweight loss is precisely half the monopoly prot. More gen-
erally, the following result shows that the condition is satised provided that demand is
not too convex.2
Lemma 1 If q(p) is log-concave then deadweight loss associated with monopoly is smaller
than monopoly prot, i.e.,
V (0)  V ()   <  : (3)
Proof. Log-concavity implies
log q(p)  log q(p) + (p  p)q
0(p)
q(p)
= log q(p) +
p   p
p
;
where the equality follows from the rst-order condition for p to maximize prot. It
follows that q(p)  q(p)e1 p=p, in which case
V (0)  V ()   =
Z p
0
[q(p)  q(p)]dp  q(p)
Z p
0
[e1 p=p
   1]dp = (e  2)
which is smaller than .
In the remainder of this section we consider a duopoly market, where seller i = 1; 2
has i captive consumers (and remaining consumers consider both sellers). Thus seller i
reaches (i.e., is considered by) i  1 j consumers, and the proportion of seller is reach
which is captive is denoted i = i=i, or
i =
i
1  j
: (4)
Throughout the following analysis we label rms so that 1  2 (in which case 1  2
and 1  2). Suppose that 0 < 1 < 1, i.e., there are some captive and some contested
consumers, in which case the equilibrium with uniform pricing involves mixed strategies,
as described in the following standard result:
Lemma 2 The unique equilibrium with uniform pricing involves the two sellers choosing
prot in the same interval [1
; ], seller 1 has an atom at  =  with probability
(1   2)=1 (while seller 2 has no such atom), and seller i = 1; 2 obtains prot i1.
2Note that log-concavity also implies (1). In the proof of this lemma, log-concavity of demand is
stronger than required to be sure that deadweight loss with monopoly pricing is smaller than monopoly
prot. A weaker, but less familiar, condition which ensures this is that 1=
p
q(p) be convex (or, in the
terminology of -concavity, q is a ( 1=2)-concave function).
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Proof. This result is taken from Narasimhan (1988). For completeness we construct this
(unique) equilibrium as follows. Let seller i choose its per-consumer prot  according to
the CDF Fi(). Then for i 6= j in equilibrium these CDFs need to satisfy
  i [i + (1  i)(1  Fj())]  i1
for any  in seller is support. (Here, seller i will always sell to its ii captive customers,
and when it chooses prot  it will also sell to its (1  i)i contested customers if its rival
o¤ers a higher prot, which occurs with probability 1 Fj().) This denes two functions,
F1 and F2, which are increasing on the interval [1
; ], are both zero at  = 1
, and
where F2() = 1 (so seller 2 has no atom at  = ) and 1   F1() = (1   2)=1.
Each seller is indi¤erent over any prot in the interval [1
; ], and neither seller has an
incentive to choose prot outside this interval.
We next present our main result, which is that consumers in aggregate prefer uniform
pricing if sellers are su¢ ciently symmetric (as with the left-hand diagram in Figure 1)
while they usually prefer price discrimination if sellers are su¢ ciently asymmetric (as with
the right-hand diagram).3
Proposition 2
(i) Consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with price discrimination when
2 is su¢ ciently close to 1.
(ii) If the deadweight loss associated with monopoly is no greater than monopoly prot,
then consumer surplus is higher with price discrimination than with uniform pricing when
2 is su¢ ciently close to zero.
Proof. As in section 2, with price discrimination consumer surplus is
(1  )V (0) + V () ; (5)
while industry prot is , where  = 1 + 2 is the fraction of captive customers in
the market. The proof for part (i) nds a lower bound on consumer surplus with uniform
pricing and shows when this lower bound is greater than (5), while part (ii) nds an upper
3This result and the next are stated in terms of the captive-to-reach ratios in (4), rather than in terms
of (1; 2) or (1; 2). This is because the market is dened for any (1; 2) 2 [0; 1]2, while working with
other parameterizations requires extra constraints (such as that 1 + 2  1).
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bound on consumer surplus with uniform pricing and shows when this upper bound is
below (5). In the following analysis we parameterize the market in terms of (1; 2), in
which case the numbers of captive customers and reach can be expressed as
i =
i(1  j)
1  12
;  = 1  (1  1)(1  2)
1  12
; i =
1  j
1  12
: (6)
(i) We show that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with price
discrimination whenever
2 
V (0)  V (1)
V (0)  V () : (7)
Lemma 2 shows that industry prot with uniform pricing is (1+2)1
 and the smallest
prot o¤ered in equilibrium is 0 = 1
. This industry prot is unchanged if the distri-
bution of prot across consumers is altered so that 2 consumers generate prot 0 and
the remainder generate prot . (Formally, (1 + 2)1
 = (1   2) + 20.) This
hypothetical prot distribution is therefore a mean-preserving spread of the true distrib-
ution under uniform pricing, in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Since V () is
a concave function, aggregate consumer surplus with this hypothetical prot distribution,
which is
2V (1
) + (1  2)V () ;
cannot be greater than the equilibrium consumer surplus with uniform pricing. Since
consumer surplus with price discrimination is (5), a su¢ cient condition for consumers to
prefer uniform pricing is
2 [V (1
)  V ()]  (1  ) [V (0)  V ()] (8)
which from (6) reduces to condition (7). Finally, to check that (7) holds when the two
rms are symmetric, observe that when 2 = 1 condition (7) requires V (1
)  (1  
1)V (0) + 1V (
), which follows from the concavity of V ().
(ii) We show that consumer surplus is higher with price discrimination than with uni-
form pricing whenever
2  1  (1 + 1)
V ( 21
1+1
)  V ()
V (0)  V () : (9)
Lemma 2 shows that industry prot with uniform pricing is   1(1 + 2) and that
the larger rm chooses the monopoly prot  with probability (1   2)=1. Therefore,
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a consumer will pay  if she is captive to rm 1 and that rm chooses , and so the
fraction of consumers who pay the monopoly price is a  1(1   2).
Since industry prot consists of the prot from those consumers paying  =  and
those paying  < , we have
 = a + (1  a)E[ j  < ]
so that
E[ j  < ] =   a

1  a =
21

1 + 1
;
where the second equality follows after routine manipulation. It follows that expected
consumer surplus with uniform pricing satises
E(V ()) = aV () + (1  a)E[V () j  < ]
 aV () + (1  a)V

21

1 + 1

where the inequality follows from the concavity of V () via Jensens inequality. Therefore,
from (5) consumer surplus is higher with price discrimination if
(1  )[V (0)  V ()]  (1  a)

V

21

1 + 1

  V ()

: (10)
Since (6) implies that
1  
1  a =
1  2
1 + 1
;
this inequality can be written as (9), as claimed.
Finally, we show that the right-hand side of (9) is positive if the deadweight loss from
monopoly pricing is less than monopoly prot, i.e., if (3) holds. As
(1 + 1)

V (
21
1 + 1
)  V ()

 (1 + 1)

V (0)  V ()  21
1 + 1


= V (0)  V () + 1 [V (0)  V ()  2]
< V (0)  V () ;
the right-hand side of (9) is indeed positive. Here, the rst inequality follows since total
surplus V () +  is maximized at  = 0, and the second follows from (3).
Intuitively, part (i) of this result is true since in near-symmetric markets industry prot
is similar when sellers engage in price discrimination and when they cannot. (In either
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case, industry prot is approximately equal to the number of captive customers times .)
However, the distribution of prot across consumers is riskier with price discrimination it
is either 0 or  and since consumers are risk averse towards variation in prot they
are worse o¤ with price discrimination. When sellers are very asymmetric, though, prot
is considerably lower with price discrimination. With uniform pricing the seller with many
captive customers is unwilling to compete aggressively, and this enables the smaller rm
to achieve prot well in excess of its captive prot (which is all it can get with price
discrimination). Part (ii) of the result describes when this reduction in prot is enough to
outweigh the greater variability of prot with price discrimination. Provided that demand
is not too convex (e.g., if q(p) is log-concave), then price discrimination benets consumers
with nested reach, when only the larger seller has any captive customers.
In the limit case of unit demand, where  = 1 and V () = 1 , part (ii) of the result
applies in all situations (condition (9) then holds always), as is consistent with Corollary
1. This case corresponds to risk neutralpreferences over prot, when consumers care
only about average prot and not its variation.
Total welfare industry prot plus consumer surplus is V () +  which is also a con-
cave function of . Therefore, total welfare falls with price discrimination when the two
sellers are nearly symmetric, while in asymmetric markets the reduction in average prot
caused by discrimination may outweigh the extra riskiness of the distribution of prot.
This is formalized in the following result.
Proposition 3
(i) Total welfare is higher with uniform pricing than with price discrimination when 2 is
close to 1.
(ii) Total welfare is higher with price discrimination than with uniform pricing when 1 is
close to 1 and 2 is close to zero.
Proof. Using the notation in the proof of Proposition 2, the reduction in industry prot
caused by price discrimination is
(1 + 2)1
    = 2(1   2) = (1  a)
1   2
1 + 1
 : (11)
(i) We show that total welfare is higher with uniform pricing whenever
2 
V (0)  V (1)  1
V (0)  V ()   : (12)
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Expression (8) shows that the gain in consumer surplus with uniform pricing is at least
2 [V (1
)  V ()]  (1  ) [V (0)  V ()] ;
and combining this with the change in prot (11) implies that total welfare is higher with
uniform pricing if
2 [V (1
)  V ()]  (1  ) [V (0)  V ()] + 2(1   2)  0 :
After dividing by 2 and noting from (6) that (1  )=2 = 1  2, shows this is equivalent
to (12).
(ii) We show that total welfare is higher with price discrimination whenever
2 
V (0)  V ()  1   (1 + 1)
h
V (21

1+1
)  V ()
i
V (0)  V ()   : (13)
From (10), the gain in consumer surplus with price discrimination is at least
(1  )[V (0)  V ()]  (1  a)

V

21

1 + 1

  V ()

:
It follows that total welfare rises with price discrimination if
(1  )[V (0)  V ()]  (1  a)

V

21

1 + 1

  V ()

 (1  a)1   2
1 + 1
 ;
which after dividing by 1  a becomes the condition
1  2
1 + 1
[V (0)  V ()] 

V

21

1 + 1

  V ()

 1   2
1 + 1

which can be written as (13). When 1  1, the right-hand side of (13) is positive (it is
approximately equal to 1).
To illustrate Propositions 2 and 3, consider the example with linear demand q(p) = 2 p,
in which case p =  = 1 and V () = 1+
p
1    1
2
. Figure 2 depicts the impact of price
discrimination in terms of (1; 2), where recall that 2  1. Expression (7) shows that a
su¢ cient condition for uniform pricing to be preferred by consumers overall is that (1; 2)
lies above the upper solid curve, while expression (9) shows that a su¢ cient condition
for price discrimination to be preferred is that (1; 2) lies below the lower solid curve.
Expression (12) shows that total welfare is greater with uniform pricing when (1; 2) lies
above the upper dashed curve, while (13) shows that discrimination raises total welfare if
(1; 2) lies to the right of the lower dashed curve.
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Figure 2: Impact of price discrimination with linear demand
4 Extensions
Heterogeneous demand: Our model assumed that all consumers had the same demand
function, q(p), which is clearly highly restrictive. However, the same analysis applies if
consumers have heterogeneous demand functions, provided that their demand was inde-
pendent of whether or not they are captive. For example, suppose the type- consumer
has demand function q(p), where the distribution for the type parameter  is the same
regardless of whether the consumer was captive to rm 1, captive to rm 2, or contested.
If we write q(p) for the expected (or aggregate) demand function across , then provided
condition (1) holds for this aggregate demand function, our welfare analysis continues to
apply as stated. (Now (p) is expected prot across consumers when a rm chooses price
p, v(p) is expected consumer surplus with price p, and we can still dene the function V ()
in (2) which relates consumer surplus to prot.)
Less precise information: Our model assumed that sellers possess accurate information
about whether a consumer was captive or not in e¤ect, in which segment on the Venn
diagram in Figure 1 a consumer is located and a natural question is how the results change
when sellers have noisier information about a consumers options. To discuss this, suppose
for simplicity that information about a given consumer is public, so that the two sellers
have the same information about each consumer. Suppose also that sellers are symmetric,
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where the total fraction of captives is  (so each seller has =2 captive customers).
At least two kinds of noisy consumer information can be considered. First, sellers
might have information about whether a consumer is likely to be captive or not, but not
to which seller she is captive. Such information preserves symmetry between sellers (so
that conditional on sellers seeing a signal the market looks like the left-hand diagram on
Figure 1), and equilibrium prot is the same as when sellers use uniform prices. Sellers
set high prices when the customer is likely to be captive and low prices when she is likely
to be contested, with the result that the distribution of prot across consumers is again
a mean-preserving spread relative to the regime with uniform pricing, and consumers in
aggregate are harmed by this form of price discrimination. Thus, price discrimination
based on information of this form has the same qualitative implications as in our main
model.
Alternatively, information might reveal to which seller a consumer is captive (if she
is captive), in which case competition for the consumer is tilted in favour of that seller.
Because competition is often less intense in asymmetric markets, information of this form
may increase prot and raise prices. To illustrate, consider a scenario where all consumers
are initially attached to one seller or the other (but not both), in equal numbers. A
proportion  of a sellers attached customer base is is captive to that seller, while the
remainder is footloose and will buy from the rival if its price is lower. (For instance,
erstwhile regional energy monopolies with an existing customer base could be permitted to
serve each others markets, or, more generally, sellers have a base of existing customers.)
Suppose it is common knowledge to which seller a consumer is attached (but not whether
the consumer is captive). By construction, if a consumer is known to be attached to one
seller she cannot be captive to the rival, and so the market segment of consumers attached
to a given seller looks like the right-hand diagram on Figure 1. The policy issue is whether
or not a seller should be permitted to set di¤erent prices to its own customer base and to
customers attached to the rival.
If price discrimination is not permitted, Lemma 2 shows that each seller chooses prot
with the same CDF F () which satises
  [1
2
 + (1  )(1  F ())] = 1
2

so that
1  F () = 
2(1  )



  1

: (14)
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Suppose next that sellers can set di¤erent prices to the two customer bases. If a consumer
is attached to seller i, Bayesrule implies that this consumer is captive to seller i with
probability  and otherwise she considers both sellers. Lemma 2 implies that the two
sellers then choose CDFs Fi and Fj which respectively satisfy
  [ + (1  )(1  Fj())] =  ;   [(1  )(1  Fi())] = (1  )
so that
1  Fi() = 


; 1  Fj() = 
1  



  1

: (15)
Here, rm i sets higher prices, in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance, than
rm j since the consumer might be captive to rm i and cannot be captive to rm j.
More strikingly, with price discrimination both sellers choose higher prices, in the sense of
rst-order stochastic dominance, than they do with uniform pricing in (14). Intuitively,
seller i raises its price since it has a greater proportion of captives relative to the market
with uniform pricing, and this enables the rival too to raise its prices.
Thus, permitting price discrimination of this form induces sellers to raise their prices
relative to the regime with uniform pricing. A market that is symmetric under uniform
pricing is converted to a mirror pair of asymmetric markets by price discrimination. The
result is that equilibrium prices rise, and all consumers are made worse o¤. This contrasts
with our main model (with symmetric sellers), where price discrimination made the dis-
tribution of prot riskier, and benetted the contested consumers, but average prot was
una¤ected. The example therefore illustrates that, with noisy information about consumer
captivity, freedom to engage in price discrimination may a¤ect not only the variability
of prots but also the e¤ective degree of market asymmetry and hence the competitive
intensity.
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